Trust zones and crossing rules, the abuse-case threat model with residual risk stated, the identity fabric, the full asset-mapped control catalog, security operations, and AI-specific security.
Six rules govern every design in this package: least privilege (scoped identities, JIT elevation),
deny by default (network, topics, data zones, tool grants), separation of duties (authorship ≠ deploy approval;
backup admin realm ≠ production IdP), secure defaults (golden paths ship compliant), complete mediation
(edge gateway for APIs, AI gateway for models, B2B gateway for partners — no side doors), and defense in depth
(edge → gateway → service → data controls layered, each assuming the previous failed). Controls are mapped to components and flows —
never listed in the abstract: see section 5 and data/controls.json.
Eight (+1 logical) trust zones; every crossing is mediated, authenticated, encrypted and logged. Zone membership is a node field rendered on every view; crossings are visible as relationships with full security metadata (click any edge in the app).
| Zone | Meaning |
|---|---|
internet | Internet (untrusted) |
dmz-edge | Edge / DMZ (mediated ingress) |
app-internal | Application zone (private) |
data-internal | Data zone (private, restricted egress) |
mgmt-plane | Management plane (privileged) |
partner-boundary | Partner boundary (contracted external) |
onprem-legacy | On-premises / legacy zone |
saas-external | SaaS / external provider zone |
n/a | Not applicable (logical / organizational) |
| Crossing | Mediation rule |
|---|---|
| internet → dmz-edge | Only via CDN/WAF/DDoS stack (sec-edge); TLS terminated and re-established; bot management active. |
| dmz-edge → app-internal | Only via the API gateway with validated tokens (C-APP-01); gateway-to-upstream mTLS. |
| app-internal → data-internal | Private endpoints only; workload identity; classification-compatible access enforced by policy; no public data-plane endpoints (scan target: zero). |
| app-internal → saas-external | Egress via inspected paths; OAuth service principals with least scopes; vendor terms reviewed (procurement + security). |
| partner-boundary ↔ internal | Only via B2B gateway/MFT with per-partner identity; canonical validation before anything internal consumes partner input. |
| anything → mgmt-plane | PAM-brokered JIT human access with recording; workload paths via IaC/GitOps pipelines only. |
| onprem-legacy ↔ cloud | Private connectivity only; legacy interfaces wrapped by the ACL; legacy service accounts vaulted and flagged as expiring exceptions. |
| AI runtime → anything | Models via the AI gateway only; agent tools via the tool registry only; retrieval entitlement-filtered (C-AI-01/03/04). |
Method: assets and entry points from the canonical model; abuse cases below cover the highest-consequence classes. This is a living register — P1 discovery and each new capability extend it. Residual risk is stated, not hidden.
| Abuse case | Actor | Entry points | Mitigations | Controls | Residual risk & test focus |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Credential theft / phishing (workforce) | External attacker | IdP login, MFA fatigue, session tokens | Phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access, session revocation, sign-in analytics to SIEM | C-ID-01, C-OPS-03 | Residual: token theft post-auth — short lifetimes + revocation drills |
| Credential stuffing / account takeover (customers) | External attacker | CIAM registration/login, password reset | Risk-based MFA, bot protection on auth endpoints, breach-password screening, rate limits | C-ID-02, C-NET-01, C-APP-03 | Residual: low-and-slow attacks — detection tuning |
| API abuse & injection | External attacker / malicious partner | Edge gateway, partner APIs, webhooks | WAF, schema validation, authN/Z on every call, rate limits/quotas, webhook signature verification | C-NET-01, C-APP-01/02/03 | Residual: business-logic abuse — abuse-case monitoring |
| Lateral movement after workload compromise | Attacker with a foothold | East-west network, service credentials | Deny-by-default segmentation, workload identity + mTLS, no static secrets, EDR on workloads | C-NET-02, C-ID-04, C-APP-04 | Residual: same-namespace movement — runtime detection depth |
| Supply-chain injection (dependency/pipeline) | External attacker / insider | Dependencies, CI runners, registry | Scan gates, SBOM, signing + provenance verified at admission, branch protection, separation of duties | C-SC-01…04 | Residual: novel upstream compromise — provenance limits blast radius |
| Ransomware incl. backup destruction | Criminal actor with admin theft | Backup credentials, storage APIs | Immutability windows, isolated cyber vault with separate credential realm, restore drills, PAM/JIT on admin | C-RES-01/02, C-ID-03 | Residual: dwell-time encryption of live data — detection + tiered restore |
| Data exfiltration via analytics / AI retrieval | Insider / over-permissioned consumer / prompt attacker | Lakehouse serving, BI, RAG retrieval | Classification-driven access + masking, entitlement-filtered retrieval with provenance, DLP on user-to-SaaS, egress control | C-DP-01/03, C-AI-03, sec-sse | Residual: authorized-user misuse — UEBA-style analytics maturity |
| Prompt injection & tool abuse (agents) | External content author / malicious user | Model inputs, retrieved content, tool outputs | Guardrail filters, tool allowlists + transaction limits + sandbox, HITL above thresholds, kill switch, red-team suites | C-AI-02/04/05 | Residual: novel injection techniques — scheduled red-teaming, bounded permissions cap damage |
| Partner-boundary compromise | Compromised trading partner | B2B/EDI channels, MFT drops | Per-partner identities/certs, canonical validation before internal publish, reconciliation, anomaly alerts on document patterns | C-INT-04/05, C-OPS-03 | Residual: valid-but-fraudulent documents — business-rule screening |
| Operator error / console drift | Well-meaning insider | Cloud consoles, cluster admin | IaC-only with drift detection, JIT + session recording, change freezes, GitOps revert, PITR | C-CLD-02, C-ID-03, RB-13/17 | Residual: bad-but-valid IaC — review + progressive rollout |
Testing: control evidence per catalog entry; scheduled attack-path review joins posture data (sec-posture) with this register; pen-test scope per change class; AI red-team suites per C-AI-02. Evidence retention per C-GOV-03.
| Population | System | Model |
|---|---|---|
| Workforce (employees/contractors) | sec-idp-workforce + sec-iga | HRIS-driven JML, SSO, phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access (the human PDP), access reviews. |
| Customers | sec-ciam | Self-registration, risk-based MFA, consent capture, token issuance for channels/APIs. |
| Partners (humans) | sec-ciam federation | Brokered federation to partner IdPs where possible; partner-scoped claims. |
| Partners (systems) | int-b2b / int-mft | Per-partner certificates/keys under trading agreements; rotation via RB-08. |
| Privileged humans | sec-pam | Vaulted, JIT, recorded; break-glass dual-controlled (RB-02). |
| Services / workloads | sec-workload-id + sec-secrets | Platform-issued short-lived identities; mTLS on sensitive paths; static secrets are expiring exceptions. |
| Pipelines | OIDC federation | No long-lived cloud keys in CI; environment-scoped deploy roles with separation of duties. |
| AI agents | ai-tools grants | Tool-scoped least-privilege identities; never broad service accounts; grants expire and are recertified (RB-12). |
The zero-trust policy decision point (sec-pdp) is deliberately logical: one policy model realized across IdP conditional access (humans), gateway policies (APIs), platform admission (workloads) and retrieval filters (AI). The realization mapping lives on the node and prevents the classic gap where each PEP invents its own policy language.
49 controls across 12 categories. The canonical source is data/controls.json;
the app's security view shows the same mapping interactively (click any control chip).
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-ID-01 preventive | Workforce SSO with phishing-resistant MFA All workforce access via central IdP: SSO (OIDC/SAML), phishing-resistant MFA, conditional access evaluating device posture and context. | platform configuration | Workforce Identity Provider Employee Workspace Internal Developer Portal & Service Catalog Observability Platform (metrics / logs / traces) Collaboration & Productivity Suite ITSM & CMDB BI & Analytics Service | IdP policy export; MFA coverage report; conditional-access rule review |
| C-ID-02 preventive | Customer & partner identity via CIAM External identity handled by CIAM: registration, risk-based MFA, consent capture, token issuance; partner federation brokered - no local accounts in apps. | platform configuration | Customer & Partner Identity (CIAM) Customer Web Portal Customer Mobile App Partner Portal | CIAM tenant policy export; token lifetime config; federation agreements |
| C-ID-03 preventive | Privileged access is JIT, vaulted and recorded No standing admin rights: PAM-vaulted credentials, just-in-time elevation with approval, session recording, monitored break-glass. | platform configuration | Privileged Access Management Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure On-Premises Data Center Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) Operational Databases (per-service) | PAM access reports; break-glass drill evidence; standing-privilege scan results |
| C-ID-04 preventive | Workload identity replaces static service credentials Service-to-service auth uses platform-issued short-lived workload identities; static API keys/secrets are exceptions with expiry. | platform configuration | Workload Identity & Service Identity (mTLS) Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) Order Management Service Billing & Invoicing Service Agent Tool Registry & Execution Sandbox CI/CD Pipelines | Secret inventory trend; workload-identity adoption metric; exception register |
| C-ID-05 administrative | Joiner-mover-leaver automation with access reviews HRIS-driven provisioning/deprovisioning via IGA; periodic access certification for privileged and sensitive-data roles. | process + tooling | Identity Governance & Administration HRIS (Workforce SoR) Workforce Identity Provider | JML latency metrics; completed review campaigns; orphan-account scans |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-NET-01 preventive | Edge protection on all internet ingress WAF managed rules + DDoS absorption + bot management + TLS policy in front of every channel and the API gateway; no bypass routes. | platform configuration | WAF, DDoS & Bot Protection Customer Web Portal Customer Mobile App Partner Portal API Gateway (Edge) | Edge policy export; bypass-route scan; blocked-attack dashboards |
| C-NET-02 preventive | Deny-by-default segmentation with private endpoints East-west traffic denied unless declared; PaaS/data services reachable via private endpoints only; egress via inspected hub. | policy-as-code | Network Hub & Segmentation Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) Operational Databases (per-service) Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Vector Store & Index | Network policy coverage report; public-endpoint scan (should be zero on data zone) |
| C-NET-03 preventive | Hybrid connectivity redundancy Private circuit + independent VPN failover for on-prem coexistence; capacity and failover tested on schedule. | platform configuration | Hybrid Connectivity On-Premises Data Center | Failover test records; utilization/error monitoring |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-APP-01 preventive | OAuth2/OIDC discipline on every API Token validation (issuer, audience, expiry, signature), scopes/claims authorization, replay protection, key rotation; enforced at gateway and re-checked in services. | gateway + service config | API Gateway (Edge) Experience API - Customer BFF Experience API - Partner BFF Order Management Service Billing & Invoicing Service AI Gateway & Model Access Control | Gateway policy export; contract tests asserting 401/403 behavior; key-rotation log |
| C-APP-02 preventive | Schema validation and input handling at boundaries Request/response schema validation, input sanitization, output encoding; contract tests in CI block drift. | service implementation + CI | Experience API - Customer BFF Experience API - Partner BFF Order Management Service Customer Profile Service API Gateway (Edge) | CI contract-test results; fuzzing findings trend |
| C-APP-03 preventive | Rate limiting, quotas and abuse monitoring Per-client rate limits and quotas at the gateway; anomaly-based abuse detection feeding SIEM. | gateway configuration | API Gateway (Edge) Experience API - Partner BFF AI Gateway & Model Access Control | Limit policy export; throttling dashboards; abuse-case runbook drills |
| C-APP-04 preventive | mTLS / service identity on sensitive internal paths Mutual TLS or platform service identity required for service-to-service calls touching restricted data. | platform configuration | Workload Identity & Service Identity (mTLS) Billing & Invoicing Service Customer Profile Service RAG Retrieval Service (authorization-aware) Operational Databases (per-service) | Mesh/identity policy export; plaintext-internal-traffic scan |
| C-APP-05 preventive | Secure session and token handling on channels Short-lived access tokens, secure refresh flows, revocation on risk signals, no sensitive data in browser storage beyond policy. | channel implementation | Customer Web Portal Customer Mobile App Partner Portal Customer & Partner Identity (CIAM) | Channel security review; token-lifetime config; revocation drill |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-DP-01 administrative | Classification drives policy Every dataset/data product registered and classified in the catalog; classification tags drive access, masking and retention automatically. | catalog + policy-as-code | Data Catalog, Lineage & Metadata Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Customer 360 Data Product Orders & Fulfillment Data Product Vector Store & Index Document & Content Service | Unclassified-dataset count (target zero); tag-to-policy mapping tests |
| C-DP-02 preventive | Encryption at rest with owned keys All stores encrypted at rest; keys in KMS (HSM-backed where justified) with documented ownership, rotation and revocation procedures. | platform configuration | KMS / HSM, PKI & Certificate Lifecycle Operational Databases (per-service) Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Vector Store & Index Backup & Immutable Backup Platform | Key inventory with owners; rotation logs; encryption coverage scan |
| C-DP-03 preventive | Masking / tokenization outside production need-to-know Restricted data masked or tokenized in non-prod, analytics and AI pipelines unless a documented exception exists. | platform configuration | Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Customer 360 Data Product Embedding & Chunking Pipeline Operational Databases (per-service) | Masking policy tests; non-prod data scans |
| C-DP-04 administrative | Retention, deletion and legal hold per record class Record classes carry retention schedules and deletion procedures; legal hold suspends deletion with auditable scope. | process + tooling | Document & Content Service Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Backup & Immutable Backup Platform Collaboration & Productivity Suite | Retention schedule; deletion-job evidence; legal-hold register |
| C-DP-05 preventive | Data residency overlay (configurable) Residency constraints (pending OQ-02) enforced via region allowlists in landing-zone policy and storage placement rules. No residency claim is made until requirements are confirmed. | policy-as-code | Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Hosted Foundation Model Services | Region-restriction policy export; placement audit |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-CLD-01 preventive | Landing-zone guardrails as code Org-level policies: allowed regions/services, mandatory tags, encryption defaults, logging on, public-exposure bans - evaluated on every deployment. | policy-as-code | Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure Policy-as-Code Engine | Policy pack version; violation trend; exemption register with expiry |
| C-CLD-02 preventive | IaC-only provisioning with drift detection Production changes flow through version-controlled IaC and GitOps reconciliation; manual console changes are detected and treated as incidents. | GitOps | IaC & Environment Provisioning (GitOps) Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) | Drift alerts; console-change audit; IaC coverage metric |
| C-CLD-03 preventive | Hardened baselines, patching and admission control CIS-aligned images (baseline reference, not certification), patch SLAs, image scanning, and admission policies rejecting unscanned/unsigned workloads. | platform configuration | Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) VM Estate (rehost landing) Artifact & Container Registry | Baseline scan results; patch SLA attainment; admission-rejection logs |
| C-CLD-04 detective | Continuous posture and workload protection CSPM misconfiguration detection against guardrails plus workload runtime protection; findings queue with remediation SLAs. | platform configuration | CNAPP (CSPM / CWPP) & Vulnerability Management Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) | Open-findings ageing; SLA attainment; recurring-finding analysis |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-SC-01 preventive | Security scanning gates in CI SAST, SCA, secret scanning, container and IaC scanning on every build; severity thresholds block release with documented emergency path. | pipeline gates | CI/CD Pipelines Source Control & Code Review | Pipeline gate config; blocked-release log; emergency-release records |
| C-SC-02 preventive | SBOM, signing and provenance verification Every artifact ships an SBOM, is signed, and carries provenance attestation; cluster admission verifies before scheduling. | pipeline + admission | CI/CD Pipelines Artifact & Container Registry Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) | Attestation coverage; admission verification logs |
| C-SC-03 preventive | Branch protection and deploy separation of duties Protected branches, mandatory review, no self-approval to production; deploy approvals separated from authorship. | platform configuration | Source Control & Code Review CI/CD Pipelines | Branch-protection export; approval audit samples |
| C-SC-04 corrective | Vulnerability lifecycle with expiring exceptions Findings triaged by severity with remediation SLAs; exceptions require owner, compensating control and expiry date. | process + tooling | CNAPP (CSPM / CWPP) & Vulnerability Management CI/CD Pipelines ITSM & CMDB | SLA attainment; exception register review |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-INT-01 preventive | Contract and schema governance APIs and events are contract-first; registry-enforced compatibility (backward) with major-version process for breaking changes. | registry + CI | Schema & Contract Registry API Management & Developer Portal Event Streaming Backbone | Compatibility-check logs; breaking-change approvals |
| C-INT-02 corrective | DLQ, replay and poison-message handling Every consumer has bounded retries then DLQ with owner alerting; replay procedures documented and rehearsed. | platform configuration | Event Streaming Backbone Message Queue Broker Fulfillment Orchestration Service Notification Service B2B Gateway (EDI / AS2) | DLQ depth dashboards; replay drill records |
| C-INT-03 preventive | Idempotent consumers and deduplication At-least-once delivery assumed everywhere; consumers dedupe on event/command ids; producers use outbox pattern. | service implementation | Fulfillment Orchestration Service Notification Service Document & Content Service Stream Processing | Idempotency tests in CI; duplicate-processing incident trend |
| C-INT-04 preventive | Governed file transfer integrity All partner/bank file exchange via MFT/B2B gateway: encryption, checksums, non-repudiation logs, window monitoring - no ad-hoc scripts. | platform configuration | Managed File Transfer B2B Gateway (EDI / AS2) Trading Partners (EDI / API) | Transfer logs with checksums; ad-hoc-transfer scan |
| C-INT-05 detective | Reconciliation on financial and partner flows Independent reconciliation (counts + amounts) between systems on billing, payment and partner document flows; discrepancies alert to business owners. | scheduled jobs | Billing & Invoicing Service ERP (Finance & Procurement SoR) Payment Service Provider B2B Gateway (EDI / AS2) | Reconciliation reports; discrepancy ageing |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-AI-01 preventive | All model access through the AI gateway No application holds provider keys; gateway enforces per-consumer authN/Z, model allowlists, quotas and logging with redaction. | gateway configuration | AI Gateway & Model Access Control Hosted Foundation Model Services Self-Managed Model Serving RAG Retrieval Service (authorization-aware) Agent Orchestrator & Planner | Direct-provider-egress scan (target zero); gateway policy export |
| C-AI-02 preventive | Prompt-injection defense and output validation Input/output guardrails: injection heuristics, content safety categories, sensitive-data redaction, tool-output sanitization; scheduled red-team suites. | inline filters + testing | AI Safety Guardrails & Content Filtering AI Gateway & Model Access Control Agent Orchestrator & Planner | Red-team results; filter-block metrics; regression suite in CI |
| C-AI-03 preventive | Authorization-aware retrieval with provenance RAG retrieval filters by caller entitlements before context assembly; responses carry citations; only cataloged, classified sources are embedded. | service implementation | RAG Retrieval Service (authorization-aware) Vector Store & Index Embedding & Chunking Pipeline Data Catalog, Lineage & Metadata | Entitlement-bypass tests; provenance coverage metric |
| C-AI-04 preventive | Agent tools are allowlisted, scoped and sandboxed Agents act only via registered tools with least-privilege grants, transaction limits and sandboxed execution; no broad production permissions by default. | platform configuration | Agent Tool Registry & Execution Sandbox Agent Orchestrator & Planner API Gateway (Edge) | Tool grant register; sandbox escape tests; permission diff audits |
| C-AI-05 preventive | Human approval and kill switch for high-impact actions Governance-defined thresholds route actions to human approval; kill switch disables agents/models per scope with rehearsed procedure (RB-12). | workflow + platform | Human-in-the-Loop Approval Service Agent Orchestrator & Planner AI Gateway & Model Access Control | Approval audit trail; kill-switch drill records |
| C-AI-06 detective | AI evaluation, drift and cost monitoring Scheduled evals against golden sets (incl. hallucination checks), drift monitors, token/inference budgets with alerts and fallback routes. | platform configuration | AI Observability & Cost Controls ML Platform (training, registry, evaluation) AI Gateway & Model Access Control Cost Management & Allocation Tooling | Eval score trends; drift alerts; budget-vs-actual reports |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-OPS-01 detective | Standard telemetry with correlation ids OpenTelemetry-conformant metrics/logs/traces with propagated correlation ids on every service and platform; SLOs with named owners. | instrumentation standard | Telemetry Pipeline (OpenTelemetry) Observability Platform (metrics / logs / traces) Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) API Gateway (Edge) Order Management Service | Instrumentation coverage; orphan-alert audit (every alert has an owner) |
| C-OPS-02 detective | Synthetic and real-user monitoring of key journeys Synthetic probes for order placement, login and partner document submission plus RUM on channels; DR checks reuse synthetics. | platform configuration | Synthetic Monitoring, RUM & DEM Customer Web Portal Partner Portal | Synthetic uptime history; journey coverage list |
| C-OPS-03 detective | SIEM onboarding is part of go-live Every new platform/service onboards security-relevant logs to SIEM before production; detections mapped to a public threat framework. | process + tooling | SIEM & Security Analytics Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure API Gateway (Edge) AI Gateway & Model Access Control | Source-onboarding checklist evidence; detection coverage map |
| C-OPS-04 corrective | Automated response with human gates Containment playbooks (token revoke, host isolate, account disable) automated with human approval for destructive/irreversible steps. | SOAR playbooks | SOAR & Response Automation SIEM & Security Analytics Workforce Identity Provider | Playbook run logs; approval records; response-time trend |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-RES-01 corrective | Backups with immutability and tested restores Policy-driven backups with immutability windows on critical sets; restore tests on schedule - restore evidence is the control, not job success. | platform configuration | Backup & Immutable Backup Platform Operational Databases (per-service) Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) Legacy Core Business System (Monolith) | Restore test records with timings; immutability config export |
| C-RES-02 corrective | Isolated cyber-recovery vault Delayed, immutable replication of tier-1 recovery data to a vault with separate credentials and access path; assumes primary backup compromise. | platform configuration | Cyber Recovery Vault Backup & Immutable Backup Platform | Vault isolation review; recovery drill from vault |
| C-RES-03 corrective | Tiered DR runbooks, rehearsed Per-tier failover/failback sequences with dependency ordering and data-consistency checks; rehearsals produce timed evidence against placeholder objectives until BIA sets real ones. | process + tooling | DR Orchestration & Recovery Runbooks Order Management Service Operational Databases (per-service) Event Streaming Backbone | DR exercise reports; gap actions tracked |
| C-RES-04 preventive | Multi-AZ by default for critical tiers T1/T2 services and stateful platforms deploy across availability zones; single-AZ deployments require an expiring exception. Multi-REGION posture is a separate open decision (OD-01) - not assumed. | platform configuration | Container Platform (managed Kubernetes) Operational Databases (per-service) Event Streaming Backbone Lakehouse (raw / validated / curated / serving) | AZ-distribution audit; exception register |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-GOV-01 administrative | Decisions and exceptions are recorded and expiring Material choices captured as ADRs; deviations tracked as exceptions with owner, compensating control and expiry; both reviewed on cadence. | process | Architecture Review Board Architecture Repository & Standards | ADR log; exception register ageing |
| C-GOV-02 detective | Tagging, allocation, budgets and anomaly detection Mandatory ownership/cost tags enforced at deploy; budgets and anomaly alerts per product; showback (chargeback pending org decision) and unit-economics reporting. | policy-as-code + tooling | Cost Management & Allocation Tooling Cloud Landing Zones & Account Structure Policy-as-Code Engine | Tag coverage; anomaly response times; budget variance reports |
| C-GOV-03 administrative | Control evidence retention Control test results, approvals, review minutes and drill records retained per audit policy in referenceable systems (ITSM/repo), not chat threads. | process + tooling | ITSM & CMDB Architecture Repository & Standards SIEM & Security Analytics | Evidence-retrieval spot checks |
| ID | Control | Enforcement | Applies to | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C-PRV-01 preventive | Privacy overlay: consent, minimization, DSR readiness Consent flags respected across profile, analytics and AI pipelines; data minimization at collection; data-subject-request hooks (access/delete) wired to stores. Applicable regulations pending OQ-03 - modeled as a configurable overlay, no compliance claim. | configurable overlay | Customer Profile Service Customer 360 Data Product Embedding & Chunking Pipeline Document & Content Service | Consent propagation tests; DSR drill records |
Telemetry: identity, endpoint, network, cloud control-plane, gateway, B2B and AI-gateway logs onboard to the SIEM as part of every go-live (C-OPS-03) — a platform without detections does not pass its gate. Detection: engineering mapped to a public threat framework with coverage tracked; detections are code-reviewed like software. Response: SOAR playbooks automate enrichment and containment with human approval on destructive steps (C-OPS-04); incident flow per RB-16 with evidence preservation and honest notification decisions (legal/privacy in the loop). Hunting & review: hypothesis-driven hunts on cadence; every Sev-1/2 gets a blameless PIR whose actions are tracked to closure; the risk register and this threat model are updated from real events.
The source (S41/S42) names AI ambition but no AI threat model — this section is a proposal filling that gap. Complete mediation applies twice: models only via the AI gateway (C-AI-01: allowlists, virtual keys, quotas, redacted logging) and actions only via registered tools (C-AI-04: least-privilege grants, transaction limits, sandbox, full audit). Inputs and outputs pass guardrails (C-AI-02: injection heuristics, content safety, sensitive-data redaction, tool-output sanitization) with scheduled red-team suites. Retrieval is entitlement-filtered with provenance (C-AI-03) so RAG cannot become a data-leak path. High-impact actions require human approval (C-AI-05) and every scope has a rehearsed kill switch (RB-12). Evaluation, drift and token-cost monitoring (C-AI-06) make AI behavior and spend observable like any other production system. Autonomy is graduated — assist → recommend → bounded-auto — by AI-governance decision with evidence, never by default (ADR-14).
Applicable regulations are unknown (OQ-02/OQ-03) and no compliance is claimed (A-11). The architecture prepares configurable overlays instead: consent propagation and DSR hooks (C-PRV-01), retention/deletion/legal-hold per record class (C-DP-04), residency placement rules (C-DP-05), and evidence retention (C-GOV-03). When the organization confirms its regulatory set, overlays are activated and mapped — the traceability document records that activation as a model change, not a slide claim.